Why Most Academic Cryptographers Don’t Care About Mass Surveillance

Why Most Academic Cryptographers Don’t Care About Mass Surveillance

Tuesday, September 22, 2015 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | UC Davis School of Law | King Hall Rm 1301 | Open to the Public

Phillip Rogaway, Professor of Computer Science, University of California, Davis

Professor Rogaway’s presentation weaves together history, examples, and thoughts that might help explain how the character of academic cryptography has been developed into its current form— intellectually flourishing, yet routinely disconnected from real-world needs. In particular, Rogaway will explore why the cryptographic community has been so unresponsive to revelations of mass surveillance.

Phillip Rogaway studied theoretical cryptography at MIT (1991). He was a security architect for IBM before joining the faculty at University of California, Davis in 1994. Co-inventor of “practice-oriented provable security,” Rogaway’s work seeks to meld cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice for mutually beneficial ends.

Sponsored by the Mellon Sawyer Seminar “Surveillance Democracies?”